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Abstract
This article calls for an end to the use of the term ‘invasive species’, both in the sci-
entific and public discourse on wildlife conservation. There are two broad reasons 
for this: the first problem with the invasive species narrative is that this demonisa-
tion of ‘invasives’ is morally wrong, particularly because it usually results in the 
unjust killing of the animals in question. Following on from this, the second prob-
lem is that the narrative is also incoherent, both from scientific and philosophical 
perspectives. At the heart of both of these issues is the problem that the invasive 
species narrative oversimplifies what are in fact very complex biological processes. 
As a result, the policies carried out with the stated aim of ‘controlling’ these animals 
are often unethical. In light of the current global species decline, this article asserts 
that the way we think and talk about these animals should be changed and the term 
‘invasive species’ should be discontinued, in the hope that this leads to changes in 
practice.
Keywords Invasive species · Wildlife conservation ethics · Wildlife policy · Killing 
animals · Animal ethics
Animals which have been labelled ‘invasive species’ are the great villains of the 
wildlife conservation world. They are represented, both by the popular media and 
within academic discourse, as marauders, aliens, killers and monsters (Strayer and 
Waldman 2013). As a result, the public is encouraged to perceive these animals, 
not as valuable members of the biotic community, but as a threat that needs to be 
met with deadly force. In the USA alone the Department of Wildlife Services, the 
government body charged with monitoring invasive species, is estimated to have 
killed around 40 million animals in the past 15 years. In the UK, a member of the 
public can legally kill animals such as grey squirrels by methods that including 
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shooting, trapping and poisoning. The number of wild animals specifically targeted 
and slaughtered each year, solely because they have been deemed ‘invasive’, is thus 
impossible to accurately calculate.
There has been a great deal of recent conversation within the scientific commu-
nity as to the nature and severity of the threats posed by so-called invasives (Black-
burn and Russell 2017; Crowley et al. 2017; Bhagwat 2017). The aim of this arti-
cle is not to weigh in on the nuances within the scientific arguments at play here. I 
accept the broad premise that a species which arrives into an ecosystem that it has 
not previously been a part of, can cause harm to other species. The argument which 
I will make is that, regardless of the validity of the above premise, the invasive spe-
cies narrative is fundamentally flawed and the systematic devaluing of animal life is 
a practice that is not morally justified. It is therefore my conclusion that terms such 
as ‘invasive’, ‘non-native’ and ‘foreign’ should no longer be utilised in the wildlife 
conservation discourse. We should instead move towards a more measured under-
standing of the interactions between different species, particularly during rapid peri-
ods of environmental transformation caused by climate change.
Some in the academic community have tried to argue in defence of ‘invasive’ 
species, on the grounds that these species are filling in the ecological niches left by 
endangered or extinct species. As such, they may in fact be our best hope of regen-
erating wildlife numbers in the Anthropocene—the age of human caused extinc-
tions (Pearce 2015; Schlaepfer et  al. 2011). Others have explored the question of 
whether or not the invasive species narrative is useful or ethical with reference to 
specific events and places (van Dooren 2011; Lockwood and Latchininsky 2008). 
This article however seeks to attempt a new approach by combining these scientific 
and ethical discussions to reach a broader, more generally applicable conclusion on 
the morality of using the term ‘invasive species’.
I will argue that the invasive species narrative is fundamentally flawed and as 
such we should cease to use it. My argument rests on two main points: the first prob-
lem with the invasive species narrative is that this demonisation of ‘invasives’ is 
morally wrong, particularly when it results in the killing of the animals in question. 
Following on from this, my second point is that the narrative is in fact also incoher-
ent, both from scientific and philosophical perspectives. In highlighting these issues, 
I wish to call for changes in the way we describe and value these animals, in the 
hope that this in turn leads to changes in how public policy deals with the problems 
associated with them.
In order to address these problems this article is split into three parts. In part 
(1), I begin by looking at definitions of ‘invasive species’ and I discuss how the 
language that permeates the invasive species discourse can lead to unethical prac-
tices. In particular, I call attention to the parallels between the portrayal of animal 
and human immigrants as dangerous invaders. In part (2) I argue that branding ani-
mals ‘invasive’ is not only unethical, but it is also based on a confused understand-
ing of species migrations over time. The reason that the rhetoric of invasive species 
has become so popular is because it provides a simplistic account of what are in 
fact very complicated biological processes. As such, the invasive species discourse 
is too often used as a political tool to scapegoat other living things for problems 
that are in fact caused or exacerbated by humans. In the final section I argue that, 
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given the preceding arguments, we should discard the term ‘invasive species’ and 
instead use the term ‘potential problem species’ to describe species which appear 
to be causing harm in a given time and place. I also provide a brief overview of the 
arguments which assert that these same species could in other contexts actually be 
very valuable in helping us to reduce the species decline which is currently having 
a tremendous impact on wildlife numbers and ecosystem stability. This is not to say 
that killing animals is always wrong, but rather that killing on the grounds of ‘inva-
siveness’ is ethically contentious, and thus kill policies should be instigated using a 
different ethical framework, if they are to be used at all. This would be a significant 
step towards ending the slaughter of millions of animals each year.
Before continuing to part (1) however, it will be necessary for me outline three 
assumptions which underpin this article, but which it is not within the scope of the 
article to explain in detail. The first, is that I am working from the philosophical 
position that all animal lives have intrinsic value, and that as such they should be 
treated as ends-in-themselves and not as mere means-to-an-end (Regan 2004). This 
is a well established position in the animal ethics field and variations of it can be 
found throughout the literature (Singer 1990; Rachels 1991; Gruen 2011) which is 
why it shall not be elaborated upon here. Nonetheless, it is important to note because 
if an animal has intrinsic value then killing it simply to meet instrumental ends will 
be, in most cases, unethical. The second point to note is that I will be discussing 
animals, but I also acknowledge that the argument put forward here might also be 
extended to include plants, as plants are usually included in lists of ‘invasive’ spe-
cies and are routinely extirpated en mass. However, given the fact that there are a 
number of morally relevant differences between plants and animals which further 
complicate matters, this problem shall not be considered in this particular article. 
Finally, although I assert that sometimes it may be justifiable to kill the animals in 
question, detailing the circumstances under which this will be permissible is far too 
large a project to be able to include in this space. It is however an area that is ripe for 
exploration and which opens up possibilities for future research in this area.
Part (1) ‘Invasive’ Species: Definitions and the Influence of Language 
on Practice
In this section I will look at ethical problems arising from the language that we use 
to describe non-native animals. Words such as ‘invaders’, ‘foreigners’ and ‘aliens’ 
are frequently used to create a sense of otherness, making the persecution of non-
native animals seem justifiable. This has parallels with narratives surrounding the 
vilification of human migrants (Staszak 2008). It is reasonable to assume that this 
kind of language will influence public perceptions (of both the humans and non-
humans being described in these kinds of terms). Such language in modern wildlife 
politics is thus both misleading and morally inappropriate. Before discussing these 
issues in depth however I will provide some brief, historical background.
The categorisation of animals and plants as ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ or ‘inva-
sive’ species only began in earnest in the nineteenth century, when amateur botanist 
H.C. Watson sought to devise a way to distinguish between long established and 
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newly emerging plant species in Britain (Thompson 2014). He defined ‘native spe-
cies’ as those who were not introduced by human agency. To this day the conserva-
tion community has largely stuck by this definition but, as we shall see, it is too 
vague to be the basis of ethical wildlife management. Watson made the distinction 
between native and non-native species largely as part of an exercise in data collec-
tion and cataloging, but he fully acknowledged that we could not always put species 
into these categories with absolute certainty, because our knowledge of their history 
is limited.
Today however, this system of classification is no longer only of interest to bota-
nists and zoologists, it is part of public policy. Watson’s definition of native species 
is used today by organisations such as the Non-Native Species Secretariat (NNSS), 
which advises the UK government on how to react to the arrival of non-native spe-
cies (Anon 2019a, b). Both the NNSS and the International Union for the Conser-
vation of Nature (IUCN) consider the terms ‘non-native’ and ‘alien’ as being syn-
onymous with one another. The term ‘invasive’ however is only used to describe 
non-native species that cause damage, either to the environment, economies or to 
human health. As I shall show later in the article, it is also often used by the media 
in a way which portrays conflict between natives and non-natives as a story of good 
vs evil. Using the terms ‘non-native’ and ‘invasive’ side-by-side can create the 
impression that species are dangerous precisely because they are not native. As shall 
be shown throughout this article, this careless use of language risks demonising and 
killing other living things, with little or no sound justification.
In most circumstances, issues in conservation biology and policy are either 
framed in cold, scientific and seemingly objective terms or else they are sympathetic 
in tone, after all the aim of conservation strategies is usually to protect living things. 
However, the branch of conservation studies known as ‘invasion biology’ takes a 
very different tone. The following extract comes from The Ecology of Invasions by 
Animals and Plants, by Charles S. Elton, who is often considered to be the grandfa-
ther of invasion biology:
[…] I have described some of the successful invaders establishing themselves 
in a new land or sea, as a war correspondent might write a series of dispatches 
recounting the quiet infiltration of commando forces, the surprise attacks, 
the successive waves […] of attack and counter attack (sic) and the eventual 
expansion and occupation of territory. (Elton 1958)
We may be tempted to forgive Elton for his preoccupation with militaristic meta-
phors, he had after all lived through both World Wars and was writing during the 
era of Vietnam and the Cold War. Unfortunately this combative, militaristic way 
of writing about non-native species has proven to be a significant part of Elton’s 
legacy. Even in current journals and newspapers, species are frequently described 
as ‘aggressive killers’, ‘enemies’ who ‘slaughter’, ‘wreak havoc’ and ‘run ram-
pant’. By way of response we must ‘wage war’, ‘control’ and form ‘defence strate-
gies’ against them (Larson 2005). This personification and demonising of other 
living things is morally unacceptable because metaphors like these are not simply 
artistic embellishments, they are designed specifically to provoke emotions such 
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as fear and revulsion. As a result, people are made to feel justified in either allow-
ing their deaths or actively participating in them.
The scientific community is just as responsible for the dispersal of this aggres-
sive rhetoric as the popular media. As Matthew Chew and Manfred Laubichler 
describe in an article for the journal Science, metaphors can be used by scientists 
to make complicated biological process accessible to the general public. This is 
not in-and-of-itself a bad thing, but in doing this there is always a risk that the 
metaphor can be misunderstood or misappropriated (Chew and Laubichler 2003). 
This is evident in the invasion biology discourse. Of course it is safe to say that 
some species cause some damage in some circumstances, and in cases where the 
arrival of new species may introduce fatal diseases, such as malaria, we must of 
course take some form of action. But to paint animals and plants as malicious 
conquerors is to miss several very important points.
The first is the issue of intention; no biologist would argue that organisms such 
as insects, molluscs, or even most mammals can literally be intent on destruction, 
because they do not have the mental capacity to form complex intentions. Yet the 
image of invading hordes suggests that other living things are not only capable of 
such things but that this is actually what they are doing. While one may be able to 
argue that primates and other highly intelligent mammals and birds may be capa-
ble of forming something akin to intentions, it is still a huge stretch to suggest 
that these intentions are malicious and directed towards us.
Secondly, the nativist discourse tends to overlook the fact that most non-native 
species are either completely harmless or very useful in their new environment. 
For instance, wheat, rice, cattle, poultry and honeybees are all non-native to the 
USA. Some of these species (cattle and poultry, which are factory farmed for 
example) have had an enormous, negative environmental impact, but there are no 
government approved programs for reducing their numbers, because these ani-
mals are economically useful to us (United Nations News 2006). This inconsist-
ent application of labels like ‘invasive’ or ‘non-native’ is similar to the narra-
tive that we see in human-centred politics, which is evident when we talk about 
‘the right kind of migrant’, where those who are useful can be integrated and 
accepted, while those who do not provide obvious economic benefits are margin-
alised (Mahtani 2017).
Further to this, perhaps most troubling issue with the language surrounding inva-
sive species, is that adjectives such as ‘aggressive’ and ‘killer’ are frequently cou-
pled with terms such as ‘foreign’, ‘exotic’ and ‘non-native’. The coupling of these 
terms is worrying because it reflects the xenophobic narratives that often accom-
pany discussions of human immigration. In his article ‘The Aliens have landed!’, 
Banu Subramaniam points to several parallels which can be drawn between the 
way we describe foreign species and the way we describe foreign people (Subra-
maniam 2001). Non-native animals and humans are depicted as ‘others’, somehow 
fundamentally different from ourselves. They are often painted as aggressive, sexu-
ally voracious and likely to be ‘here to stay’, if given half the chance. They are also 
depicted as a silent hoard, taking over ‘our’ lands and waterways, often by stealthy 
and subversive means. For example, a 2012 poster by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service came with the following opening statement:
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This Halloween you might be expecting a parade of monsters, ghosts, vam-
pires and werewolves to come knocking on your door […] But even more 
frightening is the knowledge that every day alien invaders […] are sneak-
ing into our lakes, rivers, streams and even oceans and these critters aren’t 
polite enough to knock! (USFWS 2012)
While such blatant attempts at fear mongering are far less likely to appear in 
government documents regarding human immigrants, the media is still rife with 
headlines and stories which attempt to evoke the same basic emotions. Take for 
instance a story from 2015 in the UK’s Daily Telegraph which argued that ille-
gal immigrants are a threat to the nation’s food supply, because they “sneak” 
into lorries containing fresh food, which then has to be discarded (Anon 2015).
This leads us to another parallel that is drawn between invasive species and 
immigrant humans: they are invariably described as destructive in some way. 
Just as immigrants are accused of taking local people’s jobs, so invasive spe-
cies are accused of out-competing native flora and fauna. At their very worst, 
arguments such as these take on an overtly xenophobic tone. This has led sev-
eral scholars to draw comparisons between current ecological, nativist move-
ments and Heinrich Himmler’s ‘Rules of the Design of the Landscape’, which 
demanded the exclusive use of native German plants in gardening (Peretti 1998).
While the comparison of organisations such as Natural England to Nazi Ger-
many may seem a little extreme, there is one very clear commonality between 
their ideologies. Both have a very skewed vision of what it means for a thing to 
be ‘native’, their systems of categorisation are arbitrary and show a complete 
disregard for biogeographical history. This will be the subject of part (2) of this 
essay. Before closing this section, it is important to reiterate the point that public 
perceptions of non-natives are often tainted by the language that this discourse 
is couched in. The terms ‘alien’, ‘invasive’ and ‘non-native’ evoke fear of ‘the 
other’. Such language stirs up sentiments which are strikingly similar to xeno-
phobia in inter-human relationships, and the creation of such negative emotions 
makes it harder to take a more objective ethical stance on how to manage con-
flicts between humans and non-human species. Furthermore, the behaviour of 
these ‘invaders’ is often described using militaristic tones and metaphors. By 
personifying and painting these living things as thugs or barbarians intent on 
destruction, groups and policy makers intent on carrying out culls are better able 
to gather public support through this appeal to fear.
In summary, there are two key points which this section has put put forward: 
firstly, the animals often labeled ‘invasive’ cannot literally have malicious inten-
tion, to portray them as having such intentions is misleading and therefore we 
should stop to ask about the moral justification of our linguistic practice. Sec-
ondly, we are using language which is resonant of xenophobic discussions of 
human immigrants, and this too is morally innappropriate. In the next section, I 
will show that in addition to these moral issues, there are also practical problems 
with the discourse.
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Part (2) The Incoherence of the ‘Non‑native’ Argument
‘Invasive’ species stand accused of a number of crimes, from costing the global 
economy trillions of dollars each year to being the greatest threat to biodiver-
sity on remote islands (Steiner 2010). The validity of such claims will be consid-
ered and challenged in this section through discussion of four central points: the 
first is that the invasive species discourse relies on a human-centred conception 
of the ‘proper’ place for living things in the world. My second point is that this 
kind of anthropocentrism is not grounded in a scientific understanding of how 
life on Earth actually functions. The third point is that this anthropocentric view 
excuses human violence toward animals. The final issue is that in targeting ani-
mals for causing environmental problems, we too easily overlook the possibility 
that these problems may in fact have originally arisen from human actions. As 
previously stated, I do not dispute the notion that under certain circumstances, 
some non-human species can cause significant harms. However, these harms are 
usually only a small part of a broader problem and the invasive species discourse 
is unhelpful as a part of conservation practice as it only serves to distract us from 
wider, and often much deeper, problems.
As I mentioned in the previous section, distinctions such as ‘native/non-native’ 
and ‘invasive’ are often used by both scientists and politicians as a simple means 
of explaining very complex processes. The most significant process, in this con-
text, is species migration. By conflating the concept of nativeness with the arrival 
of humans, in line with H.C. Watson, the biological invasion discourse projects a 
false image of biogeographical history, because the history of life on Earth does 
not actually begin and end with the arrival of humans. This results in several ethi-
cal and practical problems. The first problem is that it assumes that humans have 
dominion and centrality in the way that the Earth is organised; that we are the 
shapers of this world and that we alone should dictate which species go where. 
Such blatant anthropocentrism assumes that before humans came along that 
nature was in a state of disorder and that we have formed order from the chaos. 
Ken Thompson, in his book Where do Camels Belong? criticises this belief in 
what he terms ‘the frozen moment’ (Thompson 2014). The frozen moment envi-
sions humanity as a metaphorical glacier, as it sweeps across the globe the ani-
mals and plants behind it become frozen. Where they find themselves at this time 
is where they are ‘meant’ to be. This vision of the world forever compels other 
living things to reside in the time and space that we have allotted for them.
The notion that there is a right or wrong place for living things to be in is 
highly questionable, given both our knowledge of the Earth’s history and in light 
of what may happen in the future. Since Alfred Wegener published The Origins 
of Continents and Oceans in 1915, geologists have gathered ample proof that the 
Earth’s continents move over time. Continental drift explains why fossils, such 
as that of the long extinct fern Glossopteris, have been discovered across mod-
ern day South America, Antarctica, Africa, India and Australia (UC Berkeley 
2015). Animals and plants have been moving across oceans and continents for 
practically as long as life has existed, sometimes they move because of changes in 
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climate and geography; some perform annual migrations to feed and breed; seeds, 
larvae and newborn sea creatures are often carried across oceans on the whims 
of the currents and the winds. Not only is this true of Earth’s past, it happens 
today and it is certain to continue, indeed, it may even accelerate if the effects 
of global warming become more manifest (Chen et al. 2011). The movement of 
living things over the Earth is nothing new and indeed nothing special in-and-
of-itself. Humans have, in many cases, accelerated the rate at which species can 
move around and there may be an argument to say that we should do something to 
slow the rate of change down. This though is a very different argument from that 
which states that species should remain within the confines of certain boundaries.
Because it is built on such questionable foundations it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to form any coherent conservation policy around the notion of the ‘fro-
zen moment’. What follows is a case in point: in the UK, any species which appear 
to have been in Britain when humans arrived at the end of the last ice age, roughly 
8000–12,000 years ago, is considered native. However, we simply cannot say with 
any certainty which other living beings were here at that time, our ancestors did not 
document them, fossil records are incomplete and to this day we do not have a full 
catalogue of all the living things inhabiting this island. Many species are either very 
rare or inconspicuous, Attenborough’s hawkweed (Hieracium attenboroughianum) 
for example, was first discovered in 2004. It wasn’t until 2014 though that botanists 
were able to declare that the plant is both a newly discovered, distinct species and 
that it was also a ‘native’, having probably been around since the last ice-age (Rich 
2014). If we cannot say with any certainty which species arrived when, then the 
whole concept of nativeness already seems to be built on shaky ground.
But this example only reveals a relatively minor practical problem, a more com-
plex hypothetical example can here be considered to show us why defining ‘invasive’ 
species in this anthropocentric way is logically incoherent. Homo Sapiens spread 
across the globe from Africa, gradually, beginning approximately 60,000 years ago 
and continuing until around 1200 years ago when we reached remote places such 
as New Zealand and Iceland. So, if we wish to use the ‘frozen moment’ definition 
of nativeness, we have to accept that living things ‘froze’ and became natives at 
radically different points in time. A short thought experiment will show us why this 
is problematic. Imagine two bird species, A and B. Both species exist at the same 
point in time, about 60,000 years ago, but species A lives in Africa while species 
B lives in the Middle East. Humans are living in Africa but have not yet migrated 
to the Middle East. So species A is a native of Africa but species B is not tech-
nically native to anywhere (which in itself seems odd). The global climate warms 
slightly, species B doesn’t fare well in the heat but is able to spread out and inhabit 
more northerly lands in Europe. Species B leaves the Middle East almost completely 
around 50,000 years ago, just as humans arrive there. If the climate were to cool 
again and species B retreated back to the Middle East, under the frozen moment 
argument, they could not be considered natives of the Middle East, even though they 
had been there long before humans.
At first glance perhaps this might not seem too troubling, after all the above 
example is based on events thousands of years ago. However, the very same type 
of argument is being used to construct conservation laws today. For example, the 
1 3
Wildlife Ethics and Practice: Why We Need to Change the Way We…
UK laws which deal with invasive species are largely covered by the Wildlife and 
Countryside Act of 1981 which states that a non-native species is one which “is of 
a kind which is not ordinarily resident in and is not a regular visitor to Great Britain 
in a wild state” (UK Government 2015). Schedule 9 of the Act currently lists 54 
animal and 32 plant species as non-native and invasive, as such it is illegal to release 
these species (or any hybrids) into the wild. Under proposed amendments to part 3 
of the UK’s Infrastructure Bill, native species could be classed as non-native (and 
thus added to schedule 9) if they become extinct in the UK (Ares and Montgomery 
2015). The argument for this is that once a species becomes extinct it is “not ordi-
narily resident” and so can be classed as non-native. This would prevent, or at least 
make it extremely difficult, to reintroduce species such as wolves, lynx, wild boar 
and beavers, all of which had been residents of Britain for as long, if not longer than, 
humans. The concepts of nativeness and invasiveness are thus quite clearly open to 
manipulation.
In addition to this, the invasive species narrative is an extremely dangerous con-
ception from an ethical point of view because, as Thom van Dooren argues, it pro-
vides people with a justification and a sense of moral comfort about killing those 
who are deemed not to belong. It renders the lives of non-native species illegitimate 
and not only accepts the necessity of their death but in fact supports the idea that 
conservation practice demands it (van Dooren 2011). When the value of individu-
als’ lives are diminished in this way, we do not only open the floodgates to a tide of 
unnecessary killings, but also to extreme cruelty. Van Dooren illustrates this with 
the example of foxes in Australia, who over decades have been subjected to pro-
grams of steel traps, strychnine and other painful poisons.
A final problem with the biological invasion narrative is that it overlooks the role 
that humans have played in harming other animals and in causing environmental 
degradation. An excellent example of this can be found in the UK’s policies con-
cerning red and grey squirrels. It is considered common knowledge that ‘invasive’ 
grey squirrels caused sharp declines in the UK’s population of ‘native’ reds by com-
peting with them for resources. As a result, there is widespread public animosity 
towards the grey squirrel, with many people considering them vermin. The only 
legal protection the grey receives is against inhumane treatment. However, humane 
treatment can include such practices as catching grey squirrels in a bag and clubbing 
them on the head (BBC 2015).
Putting aside for one moment the horrific treatment that the squirrels may be sub-
jected to, the evidence which connects the grey squirrel’s introduction to the red 
squirrel’s decline must be seen in the context of other factors. For example, the first 
documented red squirrel decline took place in the 18th century, long before the 
arrival of the grey. This decline was due to the destruction, by humans, of the red 
squirrel’s woodland habitat. In a rather ironic twist, the places where red squirrels 
are now thriving are in new forests which have been heavily populated by non-native 
plants such as the Sitka spruce (Humphrey 2005).
Another fact that is largely ignored is that red squirrels themselves were consid-
ered vermin before they became endangered. Between 1903 and 1933 approximately 
82,000 red squirrels were culled by the Highland Squirrel Club, who accused the 
squirrel of stripping tree bark and wreaking environmental destruction (Save Our 
 M. I. Inglis 
1 3
Squirrels n.d). This is a charge which is now levied at the grey squirrel, but typi-
cally not the red. This reveals a double standard in the way lethal policies have been 
directed against these animals.
Such double standards are evident in other policies which concern native and 
non-native species. For example, the hen harrier is a bird of prey which is con-
sidered native to Britain, yet it has been continually persecuted by gamekeepers 
because it preys on young grouse, a non-native but economically very valuable 
species. Although it is illegal to kill hen harriers, enforcement of the law has been 
extremely poor in this area. There have been no prosecutions for crimes even relat-
ing to hen harrier deaths since 2001, despite the fact that many are found shot dead 
each year and that the last available data shows that only 4 breeding pairs remain in 
England (Merrill 2015).
The squirrel and hen harrier examples both illustrate an important point: holding 
‘non-native’ species responsible for the declines of other animals is specious when 
it is humans who have enabled the non-natives to establish themselves. Species, 
whether native or non-native, will only flourish where the environment is suitable. 
If we had not culled red squirrels and decimated their habitat, the grey squirrel may 
never have been able to establish such a strong foothold in the UK. As Ken Thomp-
son points out, if introduced species thrive in their new home, or if species migrate 
because of climate change, we really have no one to blame but ourselves (Thompson 
2014).
In summary of this section, four main issues have been covered: the first is the 
invasive species discourse is highly anthropocentric, which ties into the second 
point, which is that this anthropocentric viewpoint is not backed up by our scientific 
understanding how species move across the planet over time. These first two points 
explain the logical incoherence of the invasive species narrative. The third point 
moved on to the ethical impacts of this narrative and the violence that is excused 
by it. Such violence is not only unethical because the justifications for it are rather 
illogical but, as point four illustrated, in targeting animals for causing environmental 
problems, we too easily overlook the possibility that these problems could in fact 
have been caused by humans. Considered together, I assert that these issues provide 
further reasons for calling for an end to the use of the term ‘invasive species’ and the 
other derogatory terms like ‘alien’ that accompany it.
Part (3) Valuing Invasive Species
Thus far in this article I have argued that the native-non-native distinction is: (1) sci-
entifically problematic (fundamentally and in its application); (2) is used to excuse/
justify behaviour that we would otherwise consider unethical; (3) is used to scape-
goat ‘non-native’ species for problems that humans have caused. This final, shorter, 
section will turn from looking at the past harms we have caused these animals and 
look towards a potentially positive future in which we may in fact see value in the 
animals which have up until now been labelled ‘invasive’. While I do not believe that 
animals are always benign, or that we should never take any form of action when 
they are causing serious harm to others, I do believe that our attitude towards them 
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needs to be better informed. To that end, I advocate discarding the term invasive 
species (and all the baggage that comes with it) and instead using the term ‘potential 
problem species’ to describe species which are causing harm in a given time and 
place. Whether or not these species are new to an area or not would be irrelevant 
because, as we have seen and will continue to see, the native/non-native distinction 
is simply not useful and in some cases it is actively misleading.
Earlier in this essay I noted that the Earth and its inhabitants are constantly chang-
ing, moving and adapting. Life on Earth does not stand still. At this juncture I will 
argue two points: the first is that non-native species have been valuable in creating 
the ecosystems present in the world today. Strongly linked to this, the second point 
is that it is these same, so-called ‘invaders’ that stand the best chance of creating 
resilient ecosystems in a future inescapably affected by man-made climate change.
With regards to the usefulness of non-native animals, there are a number of exam-
ples that have been cited in recent years. For example, when the islands of Mauritius 
lost their native giant tortoises, the government introduced the Aldabra tortoise from 
the Seychelles. If the tortoises had not been introduced many native fruit-bearing 
plants (whose seeds are dispersed by the animals) are likely to have also become 
extinct (Marris 2014).
Perhaps the most profound example however is the honeybee. Technically honey-
bees are native only to Africa, Europe and the Middle East, although evidence sug-
gests they may in fact have originated in Asia (Han et al. 2012). Now found across 
the globe, honeybees are an integral part of many ecosystems. According to the Brit-
ish Beekeepers Association,
Bees are pollinators vital to our food chain. One-third of the food we eat would 
not be available but for bees. […] The harvest from honey bees of honey, pol-
len, wax and propolis has nutritional, craft, manufacturing, and medical appli-
cations. […] In addition, bees pollinate the flowers of many plants which 
become part of the feed of farm animals. The economic value of honey bees 
and bumblebees as pollinators of commercially grown insect pollinated crops 
in the UK has been estimated at over £200 million per year.’ (British Beekeep-
ers Association 2019)
When we consider that these figures only relate to bees in the UK we can see that 
the contribution made by bees across the world is astounding. Bees have not only 
benefited humans, but in pollinating flowers and crops they are invaluable to an 
uncountable number of non-human animals too.
The honeybee is perhaps an obvious example, but it brings us to another 
important point. Bees, like all successful ‘non-native’ species, adapted to their 
new environments and survived by developing relationships with other species 
and by filling in niches in a particular ecosystem. If a non-native animal does 
nothing but destroy its surroundings, it will soon die out as its resources become 
depleted. Non-native animals who survive the test of time do so because they can 
cope with dramatic changes in their surroundings and can adapt accordingly. For 
this reason, environmental scholars such as Fred Pearce have argued that non-
natives should be appreciated (Pearce 2015). Given the rapid pace and the sheer 
number of environmental changes that are taking place due to climate change and 
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human activity, in order for life on Earth to continue we will need animals that 
can keep up and remain resilient.
The 2016 Living Planet Report, compiled by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), 
estimated that more than half of the world’s vertebrate species have become extinct 
in just the last 40  years (Anon 2018). Although there may be a tiny minority of 
non-native species that have contributed to problems such as this, the vast major-
ity are either benign, or may indeed prove to be helpful. A 2011 study found that 
non-native species can contribute to the survival of other animals by providing habi-
tat or food sources, by serving as substitutes for extinct species (as in the case of 
the Aldabra tortoise) or by providing other ecosystem services, such as pollination 
(Schlaepfer et  al. 2011). They can also be beneficial in the restoration of habitats 
which have been degraded by human activity. In a marine habitat on the coast of 
Chile, for example, an invertebrate called Pyura praeputialis forms large ‘mats’ in 
which other invertebrates then make their home. Scientists compared these areas 
with other nearby rocky shorelines and found 100 additional species in the areas 
containing Pyura praeputialis (Castilla et al. 2004).
We can see then that the idea that non-native species are inherently destructive is 
highly questionable. Not only can they provide benefits to other living things, they 
may well play a vital part in the construction or restoration of future ecosystems. 
This then provides yet another reason as to why terms such as ‘non-native’, ‘inva-
sive’ or ‘alien’ should no longer be used in wildlife conservation; they cause us to 
overlook the potential benefits that these animals can bring. The arguments that I 
have provided here are instrumental reasons to value animals which fill in ecological 
niches. There are also non-instrumental reasons for valuing them; arguments which 
suppose that all animals have intrinsic value would reach very similar conclusions 
to these instrumental arguments. If individuals of other species have intrinsic value 
then individuals of non-native/invasive species also have intrinsic value because 
their non-native status is morally irrelevant (despite the implicit assumptions of the 
discourse).
In conclusion, in this article I have shown that the invasive species narrative is 
fundamentally flawed and as a result I believe that both our attitudes and our public 
policies should reflect the fact that non-native ‘invasive’ species are not, by nature, 
malicious or destructive. The invasive discourse is couched in language which 
immediately prejudices people against the animals. This leads to the killing of these 
animals being viewed as both morally acceptable and indeed necessary, when in fact 
such assertions are extremely controversial.
The incoherence of the invasive species narrative stems from the fact that it con-
tradicts much of what we know about the biogeographical history of the Earth. It 
asserts that there is a right and wrong place for every species to be when in truth 
species have, and will continue, to move across the globe in order to cope with 
changes in climate, food distribution and so forth. This ability to move to new envi-
ronments and to cope with drastic change is also a part of what makes ‘invasive’ 
species potentially valuable. During periods of rapid ecological change, species 
which can survive and provide stability in an ecosystem offer the best chance the 
biosphere has of maintaining a diverse range of living things in the future.
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This potentially for animals to produce good and bad environmental conse-
quences should be much more strongly reflected in the language that we use to 
describe them. This is why I advocate discontinuing the use of the term ‘invasive’ 
and its synonyms and instead, when it does appear that a group of animals are caus-
ing environmental harm, we can put them in the category of ‘potentially harmful 
species’. It will be important to include the word ‘potentially’ because even in cases 
where we have identified a problem (e.g. the decline of red squirrels) we should 
conduct further, deeper, investigations into the causes before even considering kill-
ing them. Assessing problems in this manner would also mean the native/non-native 
term would become redundant because, as I have shown with the agricultural exam-
ples of cattle and wheat, where a species has come from has no real bearing on how 
destructive or useful it can be.
Rather than fixating on where things come from, we need to remember that, in 
terms of the Earth’s history, we are both one of the newest and most ‘invasive’ spe-
cies of all. The idea of the frozen moment, that all living things have a time and 
place in which they are meant to exist is nonsensical, and if we insist on pursuing 
this myth we are only going to continue destroying our fellow creatures, rather than 
truly protecting them.
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